Recent Attacks and a Broader Pattern
For the second time in just over a year, an explosion has claimed the life of a Russian military figure in the Moscow suburb of Balashikha. On June 9, a bomb placed beneath a BMW detonated as the driver began to exit a parking area, according to reports from the independent Russian publication The Insider. The victim was identified as Lieutenant General Damir Davydov, a Russian Defense Ministry official reportedly responsible for supplying missiles and artillery ammunition to Russian forces engaged in the conflict in Ukraine.
The location of the blast holds particular significance. It occurred approximately 1,150 feet from the site where Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, who served as deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of Russia's General Staff, was killed in a car bombing in April 2025, as reported by the French newspaper Le Monde.
Months prior to Moskalik’s death, another senior Russian officer was assassinated within Moscow. Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, who led Russia’s nuclear, biological, and chemical protection troops, died when a bomb concealed within an electric scooter exploded outside an apartment building. A source within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) informed Reuters that the agency was responsible for that operation.
These incidents collectively form part of an escalating series of assassinations and attempted killings targeting senior Russian military personnel. A European intelligence source suggests this campaign is now revealing significant tensions within President Vladimir Putin’s own security framework.
Historical Rivalry and Internal Tensions
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, high-ranking Russian military figures have perished in various ways, including missile strikes, drone attacks, car bombings, vehicle crashes, and direct combat on the front lines. This mounting death toll, according to a European intelligence source, is fueling internal friction between Russia’s armed forces and the FSB, the nation’s powerful domestic security service and successor to the Soviet-era KGB.
This disagreement reflects a deeper, long-standing rivalry embedded within President Putin’s system, where security services have historically enjoyed a more privileged status compared to the military, as confirmed by multiple sources.
“This goes back to Soviet times,” the European intelligence source noted. “The security services do not like the military, and the military does not like the security services.”
The core of this tension, according to both the European intelligence source and Russian opposition figure Maxim Katz, lies within Putin’s power structure: while the war has elevated the military's operational importance, the political system in Moscow continues to view generals as potential threats.
This dynamic creates a paradox for the Kremlin. Russia relies on its military commanders to sustain the ongoing conflict, yet the security services that dominate Putin’s system appear hesitant to assume responsibility for their protection.
Significant Military Casualties
At least 15 Russian generals have been confirmed killed since the full-scale invasion commenced, according to the independent Russian outlet Mediazona. This count includes five lieutenant generals, seven major generals, and three former generals.
Some of these deaths occurred far from Moscow, closer to the front lines of the conflict. Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of Russia’s Southern Military District, was killed in July 2023 by a Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike in the Russian-occupied city of Berdiansk. Major General Sergei Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army, died in June 2023 during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region. Major General Vladimir Zavadsky, deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps, was killed near Krynky in southern Ukraine in November 2023.
Other casualties occurred within Russia or in Russian-controlled territories. Lieutenant General Alexander Otroshchenko, a senior Russian air force commander, died in a military transport plane crash over occupied Crimea in March 2026. Retired Major General Kanamat Botashev, flying for the Wagner Group, was killed in May 2022 after his Su-25 aircraft was shot down over Ukraine’s Luhansk region.
The losses began in the initial weeks of the invasion, with the deaths of Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, deputy commander of Russia’s 41st Combined Arms Army, and Major General Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of the 8th Army.
The Vulnerable Position of Military Leaders
Katz asserts that the military has long occupied a precarious position within the Russian power hierarchy. He explained that the Kremlin has historically harbored fears of popular military figures because the army represents one of the few institutions capable of challenging political authority.
“You will not find Russian military men in senior government positions,” Katz stated. “Since Stalin, they have been afraid of the army. Whenever there is a relatively well-known military figure with a name of his own, they deal with it somehow — legally, or like with Prigozhin, or like with other generals. In Russia, there is no such thing as a popular general.”
Katz argued that even during wartime, a period when the military might be expected to gain status, Putin’s system deliberately keeps the armed forces politically weak.
“The army does not take part in decision-making,” Katz remarked. “It is funded now, but everything goes to the war. The generals are rich, but not like ministers or FSB people. Among the elites, they are the most deprived.”
This dynamic, Katz suggested, helps to clarify why Russian generals might not desire the FSB to be responsible for their protection.
“For them, the FSB is a much bigger threat than the Ukrainian army,” Katz emphasized. “The Ukrainian army kills a general once in a while. The FSB puts generals in prison much faster.”
The European intelligence source noted that these killings are significant not only for the operational losses incurred but also for their psychological impact within the Russian army.
“Putin understands that losing prominent Russian generals can affect morale within the Russian army, which is already low from the Russian perspective,” the source commented.
The apparent resolution, according to the European intelligence source, involved shifting responsibility away from the FSB.
“The FSB did not want to deal with military protection, so the security service of the Russian presidential administration would take care of those generals,” the source explained.
Upcoming Elections and Putin's Legitimacy
Katz also suggested that the internal pressure on Putin could intersect with Russia’s parliamentary elections in September, an event he believes Western observers are largely overlooking. He anticipates that the vote will not be free and that the Kremlin is expected to manipulate the outcomes.
However, he argued that if public support for Putin’s United Russia party has significantly declined, it could become more challenging for the regime to make the official results appear credible.
“Everyone already knows what results they will announce,” Katz said. “The question is whether anyone will believe those results.”
Katz explained that Putin’s system has long relied not merely on control, but on the perception that the Kremlin maintains broad public support.
“Putin has never ruled in a situation where he does not have a majority,” Katz asserted. “His legitimacy rests on everyone believing that he has majority support. Once everyone believes he does not have a majority, and that he did not just cheat a little but simply drew the results, that is a different story.”
He drew a comparison between this potential challenge and authoritarian systems compelled to transition from managed popularity to overt coercion.
“Putin cannot lose like Orban,” Katz concluded. “But if everyone in Russia knows that everyone voted against him and he drew the results in his favor, that would be a new situation. He has never been in that position before.”
